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Employment Discrimination
by John F. Dickinson*
and
F. Damon Kitchen**

Two trends in the area of employment discrimination law continued
during the 1991 survey period. First, there was a continuation of an overall decrease in the number of cases decided. Second, there was a continuation of the trend toward an increased number of age discrimination
claims. The overall decline in the number of cases will most likely change
dramatically as a result of passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Nevertheless, both the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
and the United States Supreme Court handed down a number of important decisions addressing a variety of substantive, procedural, and reme2
dial issues.
*

Partner in the firm of Corbin, Dickinson, Duvall & Margulies, Jacksonville, Florida,

Mercer University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1972); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer
University (J.D., cum laude, 1975). Member, State Bars of Florida and Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Corbin, Dickinson, Duvall & Margulies, Jacksonville, Florida.
Wake Forest University (B.A., 1985); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University
(J.D., 1990). Member, State Bars of Florida and Georgia.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 and scattered sections (Supp. 1992).
2. This Article will cover significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
that the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided during calendar year 1991. Cases arising under the following federal
statutes are included: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701718, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1988); the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 2-15, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988)) (ADEA); the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub.
L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988)); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, §§ 2-504, 87 Stat. 357 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988)); the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981) (1988)); and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
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TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964

Coverage Under the Act

In the first of two Title VII (the "Act") cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court during the survey period, the Court considered the
scope of coverage under the Act. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,'
concerned whether Title VII applies extraterritorially to regulate the employment practices of United States firms that employ American citizens
abroad. Plaintiff, an American citizen born in Lebanon, worked for a Delaware-based oil company with a principal place of business in Saudi Arabia. Plaintiff was first employed as an engineer in Texas and later transferred to Saudi Arabia.' About two years after he was transferred, his
supervisor allegedly began harassing him about his national origin, race,
and Moslem religion. Plaintiff's job status deteriorated and he was eventually terminated. Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII against his employer and the parent company alleging unlawful discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, and national origin in violation of section 703(a)(1)
of the Act.s Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim
because Title VII protections do not apply to United States citizens employed abroad by American employers.' The district court granted defendant's motion.7 A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.' Thereafter, an en
banc Fifth Circuit agreed with the panel, holding that Title VII does not
reflect a clear expression of congressional intent necessary to extend its
reach overseas.'
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
agreed with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion. 0 The Court noted that while
Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial
boundaries of the United States, whether Congress has exercised that au3.
4.
5.

111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
Id. at 1230.
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

111 S. Ct. at 1230.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1236.
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thority is "a matter of statutory construction."" The Court relied upon a
canon of statutory construction holding that federal legislation is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, unless a contrary intent appears." The Court determined that neither Title
VII's definitions of "employer" and "commerce" found in section 701,18
nor the "alien exemption provision" of section 702,14 manifested an intention by Congress to extend the statutory protections extraterritorially to a
United States employer who affects trade between a state in any place
outside thereof. Rather, both create a negative inference that Congress
intended United States citizens working abroad for United States employers to be covered.1 5
With respect to section 701, the Court observed that the jurisdictional
language was "boiler-plate," and could be found in any number of congressional acts.1 As for the alien-exemption provision, the Court reasoned
that if that provision means that the statute applies to employers overseas, "there is no way of distinguishing in its application between United
States employers and foreign employers."" The Court was unwilling to
ascribe to Congress a policy that would raise difficult issues of international law by imposing the employment-discrimination regime of the
United States upon foreign corporations operating in foreign commerce.'s
Finally, the Court refused to defer to the EEOC's interpretation that Title VII applies overseas, noting that the Commission's'position contradicted its own previous pronouncements, and lacked support in the plain
language of the statute.' 9
The decision in Arabian American Oil Co. was -overturned by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. ' 0 In language that parallels section
630(f) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967," Congress
11. Id. at 1230.
12. Id. (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
13. Section 701(b) of Title VII provides in pertinent part: "The term 'employer' means a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
14. Section 702(a) of Title VII provides in pertinent part: "This subchapter shall not
apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State .... 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1988).
15. 111 S.Ct. at 1232-34.
16. Id. at 1232.

17. Id. at 1234.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1235 (referring to EEOC Policy Statement No. N-915.033, EEOC Compl. Man.
(BNA) § 605:0055 (Apr. 1989) where the agency interpreted Title VII to apply to discrimination against American citizens abroad, and an earlier agency pronouncement).
20. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071
(codified as amended at U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 and scattered sections (Supp. 1992)).
21. Section 630(f) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act provides in pertinent
part: "[T~he term 'employee' includes any individual who is a citizen of the United States
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amended section 701(f) of Title VII,22 and Section 101(4) of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")23 to provide that United

States citizens employed in foreign countries by American-owned or controlled companies are covered by both laws.2 4 The Civil Rights Act of
1991 also amended Title VII and the ADA to provide a limited exemption
from coverage where compliance with the statutes would cause the company to violate the law of the foreign country in which it is located.25
B.

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

Disparate Treatment Cases. In the typical disparate treatment
case, absent any direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff generally
bears the familiar model of proof set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,2 ' and Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine.27 Accordingly, the plaintiff bears the ini-

tial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination." Once a
employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign 'country." 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988).
Section 623(h)(1) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act provides in pertinent part:
"filf an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is in a foreign country,

any practice by such corporation prohibited under this section shall be presumed to be such
practice by such employer." 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(1) (1988).
22. Section 701(f) of Title VII provides in pertinent part: "The term 'employee' means
an individual employed by an employer .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988).
23. Section 101(4) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 provides in pertinent
part: "The term 'employee' means an individual employed by an employer

....

"

42

U.S.C.A. § 12111(4) (1991).
24. Section 701(f) of Title VII and section 101(4) of the American With Disabilities Act
of 1990 were amended by section 109 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by adding the following: "With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual
who is a citizen of the United States." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f) (Supp. 1992) and 42 U.S.C.A. §
12111(e) (Supp. 1992).
25. Section 702(b) of Title VII was amended by adding in pertinent part:'
It shall not be unlawful . . . for an employer (or a corporation controlled by an
employer) . . . to take any action otherwise prohibited with respect to an employee in a workplace in a foreign country if compliance . . . would cause such
employer (or such corporation), .... to violate the law of the foreign country in
which such workplace is located.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(b) (Supp. 1991).
Section 102(c)(1) of the ADA was amended by adding the pertinent part:
It shall not be unlawful under this section for a covered entity to take any action
that constitutes discrimination under this section with respect to an employee in a
workplace in a foreign country if compliance with this section would cause such
covered entity to violate the law of the foreign county in which such workplace is
located.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(c)(1) (Supp. 1992).
26. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
27. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
28. 411 U.S. at 802; 450 U.S. at 252-53.
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plaintiff has done so by a preponderance of the evidence, the "burden of
production" shifts to the defendant to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the defendant's action.1' If the defendant
meets this burden, the plaintiff then must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant's articulated reason was not a true reason
and was a pretext for discrimination .3 Once a district court has entered
its findings under this model, however, regardless of the nature of the
finding, the Supreme Court has mandated that the district3 1court's determination shall not be set aside unless "clearly erroneous.
Application of the "clearly erroneous" standard resulted in differing
conclusions in two notable cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit during
the survey period. In Moulds v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,3s plaintiff, a black
female employed as a receiving department clerk, was passed over for
promotion to a position of receiving department manager. No formal application procedures existed at Wal-Mart, where plaintiff worked. Instead, managers identified employees who were interested in promotion,
and later made a selection from the qualified interested candidates. 33 In
plaintiff's case, the white male store manager first approached other receiving department employees (including a white male and two black females) to ascertain whether they were interested in the job. Plaintiff was
not approached, as her interest in promotion was already well known to
management. The seven-member committee of store managers, which included one black female, one white female, and five white males, unanimously selected a white male receiving department employee for the position."4 The selectee had one year less experience with Wal-Mart than
plaintiff.8 5 In a subsequent action brought under Title VII and section
1981, 3 the district court dismissed plaintiff's section 1981 claim prior to
trial and entered judgment for Wal-Mart under Title VII."
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that plaintiff had not met her burden of
proving that Wal-Mart's articulated reasons for not promoting her were
pretextual.3 The management committee was impressed by the selectee's
greater supervisory experience and excellent performance, and believed
that plaintiff "lacked a sufficiently strong personality to be an effective
manager in a department where she had so many friends who would be
29.
30.
31.
32,
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

411 U.S. at 802; 450 U.S. at 253.
411 U.S. at 804.
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 565 (1985).
935 F.2d 252 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 255.
42 U.S.C. § 1981.
935 F.2d at 254.
Id. at 255.
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working under her authority."' 99 The court specifically rejected plaintiff's
contention that Wal-Mart's subjective evaluation of her personality or
leadership abilities could not be accepted as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for her nonselection.' 0 The court recited defendant's evidence
that the primary reasons plaintiff was not selected for the receiving department manager position were that plaintiff had less experience and
inferior work performance.' 1 The court of appeals reasoned, that it was
not clearly erroneous for the district court to accept a subjective evaluation as nonpretextual where it is not contradicted by any evidence at
trial. " The Eleventh Circuit agreed, and affirmed the district court
decision.' s
The district court's findings failed to meet the "clearly erroneous" standard in Redd v. City of Phenix City." Plaintiff, a black male, brought an

action under Title VII and section 1983 4 alleging discrimination on the
basis of race when he was not promoted from the position of police lieutenant to chief of police, and when he was subsequently discharged.'
With respect to the promotion, the evidence revealed that the city appointed a white sergeant to the position of acting police chief when the
full-time chief abruptly retired.' 7 This appointment was made even
though plaintiff and two black captains, were the senior-most men on the
police force. The city manager testified that the white sergeant was given
the chief's position because he was an "uncontroversial figure." Hiring a
sergeant to fill the position of police chief was unusual. In previous years,
only lieutenants or captains had been selected for this post. The evidence
showed that the city never asked the only other black captain if he was
interested in the chief's position. To make matters worse, the white sergeant who was offered the position had never applied for the job."
With respect to plaintiff's discharge claim, evidence at trial revealed
that the newly appointed acting chief set up a surveillance of plaintiff so
as to "get rid" of him.'0 The city contended that plaintiff was terminated
because he stopped at a lounge one night and was charged with loitering.

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id. (citing Smith v. Homer, 839 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir. 1988)).

43.

Id. at 257.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

934 F.2d 1211 (11th Cir. 1991).
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
934 F.2d at 1213.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The day after plaintiff was discharged, the acting chief was appointed as
permanent chief of police."1
The district court directed a verdict against plaintiff on his promotion
claim. 2 A jury of seven whites and one black found in plaintiffs favor on
the discharge claim. Once the jury came back with a verdict in favor of
plaintiff, the district court determined that the verdict was not supported
by substantial evidence, and granted a motion5 for JNOV, and alternatively a new trial "if the JNOV was reversed." 3
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of
JNOV and alternative grant of a new trial, reversed the directed verdict
for defendants on the promotion claim, and remanded the case to the
district court for a new trial on the promotion issue .5 The court of appeals strongly disagreed with the district court's finding that plaintiff had
failed to prove that defendants' reasons for his discharge were pretextual.5 Noting that the district judge's order "reads like a closing argument for the defense,"5 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that there was
ample testimony in the record to support the jury's conclusion that plaintiff's discharge was discriminatory.57 To support this, the Eleventh Circuit pointed to evidence produced at trial showing that white employees
who had done what defendants' claim plaintiff did were not discharged,
and that the testimony of the city manager concerning his selection process was inconsistent and contradictory. 8 According to the Eleventh Circuit, this circumstantial evidence was enough to question the motives of
the defendants.5 9
Reverse Discrimination. Since Martin v. Wilks,60 in which the Supreme Court decided that whites may bring reverse discrimination claims
against previously approved affirmative action plans, claims of reverse
discrimination appear to be increasingly. more popular. Such was the case
during this survey period, as the Eleventh Circuit was faced with three
cases involving allegations of reverse discrimination.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 1214.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 1217. The Eleventh Circuit's ruling with respect to the JNOV issue is addressed in this article at infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
55. 934 F.2d at 1215.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1216 (citing Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Medical Ctr., 842 F.2d 291, 296 (11th Cir.
1988)).
60. 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
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Wilson v. Bailey61 represents another chapter in the long history of
claims of racial discrimination in Jefferson County, Alabama. In fact, this
setting was the backdrop of the Martin decision. Plaintiffs in Wilson
were two white deputy sheriffs who the sheriff never promoted, although
both were twice certified as candidates for promotion to sergeant.2 Plaintiffs brought their action under Title VII, and sections 1981 and 1983
against the personnel board, county, and the sheriff, alleging that defendants engaged in racially discriminatory promotion practices. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the county and the personnel board on every count." The district court determined that the personnel board was not in a position to deny plaintiffs a promotion, as this
was the function of the final decision-maker, the sheriff, and further that
the personnel board had certified plaintiffs on a list of eligible candidates." The district court also found in favor of the sheriff, concluding
that race and gender were not dispositive factors in the sheriffs decision
not to promote plaintiffs. 6
The Eleventh Circuit agreed, holding that it was proper for the sheriff
to take race and gender factors into consideration under a consent decree
which required the sheriff to make a good faith effort to hire qualified
blacks and women for entry-level positions, and to "seek to secure the
number of qualified black and female applicants for promotion to [certain
jobs] that is at least equivalent to their percentage representation in the
applicant pool from which such promotions are made." 6
In Barfus v. City of Miami,67 plaintiffs, white employees of the Miami
Fire Department, and a white employee of the Miami Police Department,
filed two Title VII actions against the city alleging reverse discrimination
in promotional practices." Although plaintiffs alleged that the city was
operating under the terms of a court approved consent decree which was
entered into by the unions of which they were members, rather than challenge the terms of the decree (which required the city to meet certain
promotional goals to enhance opportunities for minorities), plaintiffs contended that the City's promotion decisions violated Title VII, the consent
decree, and the City's civil service rules.6 9 The district court dismissed
plaintiff's complaints as impermissible collateral attacks on the consent
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

934 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
936 F.2d 1182 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1184-85.
Id. at 1185.
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decree. The court reasoned that plaintiffs were parties or privies to the
decree because their unions signed the decree and were parties to the
original discrimination suits out of which the consent decree arose.70 Further, the district court held that even if plaintiffs were not challenging
the decree, it lacked jurisdiction because enforcement of the decree was,
per the terms of the decree,
"under the supervision of the district court
' 71
that entered the decree."

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision." The court
emphasized that the complaints did not challenge the terms of the decree,
nor did they seek to modify the decree. 78 The Eleventh Circuit made note
of plaintiff's argument that they were simply contesting the City's misapplication of the decree."' Second, the court of appeals determined that the
terms of the decree did not permit nonminority members of the union to
enforce their rights in a contempt proceeding because the relief available
ran solely in favor of minority employees and applicants."° Finally, the
court determined that participation by the union in the consent decree
could not act as a waiver of nonminority union members rights to bring a
separate Title VII action.7 The case was remanded to the district court
77
for further processing.
Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County 8 is another reverse discrimination decision worth discussing, for it addressed the propriety of a government-sponsored voluntary affirmative action program under Title VII and
the United States Constitution. Plaintiff, a white male, applied for a position as a firefighter.'9 The available positions were awarded to minority
applicants pursuant to a minority preference program that called for the
selection of female, black, and Hispanic applicants in an effort to increase
the representation of these groups. The affirmative action plan was based
upon statistics which showed that there was a disproportionate number of
white male firefighters employed in the fire department compared to the
makeup of the general population. 0 The plan stated that its long-term
70. Id. at 1188.
71. Id. at 1185.
72.

Id. at 1189.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 1185-86 n.14.
75. Id. at 1187.
76. Id. at 1188. The Eleventh Circuit was careful to distinguish the facts in Barfus with
those in Mann v. City of Albany, 883 F.2d 999 (11th Cir. 1989). In Mann there had been a
factual finding by the district court that plaintiff's interests had been represented in the
underlying litigation which resulted in the consent decree. Id. at 1001.
77. 936 F.2d at 1189.
78. 940 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 969 (1992).
79. 940 F.2d at 1395.
80. d. at 1395-96.
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goal was to "attain parity" between the fire department's workforce and
the population." The plan called for hiring goals based upon at least seventy percent of the percentage of each specified minority in the general
population. Plaintiff claimed that the affirmative action plan as applied
to him violated both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution."
In a decision which predated City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,"
the district court found that the disparity of minorities in the county
compared with the percentages of minorities employed as firefighters in
the fire department justified the affirmative action plan." The district
court determined that although the position of firefighter involves specialized work, the position was "entry-level" and therefore a comparison
between the fire department's workforce and the general labor market
was appropriate.5
With different majorities on the Title VII and constitutional issues, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the affirmative
action plan did not violate Title VII, but remanded to the district court
the question of the constitutionality of the plan.8 With respect to the
Title VII analysis, the court found that there was virtually uncontradicted evidence of a gross disparity in employment of minorities in the
fire department going back to 1965.87 Citing Supreme Court authority"
for the proposition that a prima facie case of direct discrimination against
an employer is established by a statistical disparity greater than two or
three standard deviations, the court found that the facts revealed numerical disparities far in excess of such deviations. 89 Further, the majority approved the district court's usage of the general population for statistical
comparative purposes, as there was nothing in the record indicating that
the use of general population figures was improper, or that defendant had
challenged the use of general population figures.90
In a spirited dissent concerning the Title VII challenge to the plan,
Chief Judge Tjoflat argued that the general population figures should not
have been used in determining whether an imbalance existed where, as in
this case, there was evidence that the defendant employed a minimum
81. Id. at 1396.
82. Id. at 1397.
83. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
84. 940 F.2d at 1395.
85. Id. at 1396.
86. Id. at 1411.
87. Id. at 1410.
88. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299 (1977).
89. 940 F.2d at 1410.
90. Id. at 1405.
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age requirement for fire fighters.' 1 Rather, the district court should have
compared defendant's workforce to that segment of the general population that qualified for work as entry-level firefighters, taking into consideration age restrictions."
In the second majority opinion, the Eleventh Circuit remanded plaintiff's equal protection claim to the district court for reconsideration in
light of Croson." Scholars interested in an Eleventh Circuit analysis of
the Croson opinion should review Peightal, as the court went to great
lengths to discuss Croson's six separate opinions.
Fetal Protection Policies. In its second Title VII case, International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,'94 the Supreme Court was
presented with the question of whether Title VII allows an employer to
adopt a gender-drawn fetal protection policy for its employees. In 1977,
defendant, a manufacturer of batteries, adopted a policy of warning
women about the dangers of working in an environment in which they
would be exposed to lead and discouraged them from such work." In
1982, defendant adopted a policy of excluding fertile women from all
lead-exposed jobs associated with its manufacturing processes." The policy provided that women who are pregnant or capable of bearing children
would not be placed into any jobs involving exposure to lead or those
which could expose them to lead through the exercise of job bidding,
bumping, transfer, or promotion.' 7 This policy essentially barred women
capable of bearing children from all manufacturing jobs in the employer's
battery plants, and from some nonmanufacturing jobs as well. The policy
was based upon scientific evidence that employees who are exposed to
lead face health risks, one of which is the risk of harm to a fetus." Plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the policy as sex discrimination that
violated Title VII." The district court granted summary judgment to defendant, finding that the policy was justified by business necessity.100 The
court determined that the hazard to the fetus through exposure to lead
was established by a considerable body of opinion, and that no acceptable
alternative policy that would protect the fetus had been presented.' 0 '
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
111 S.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1411 (dissenting opinion).
1412 (dissenting opinion).
1411.
Ct. 1196 (1991).
1199.
1200.
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Sitting en banc, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed. 10 2 The court agreed that the policy was properly evaluated
under the business-necessity defense. The business-necessity defense involves a three-stage inquiry: whether there is a substantial risk to the
fetus, whether transmission of the hazard to the fetus occurs only through
women, and whether there is a less discriminatory alternative equally capable of preventing the health hazard to the fetus.'0 The Seventh Circuit
found no genuine issue of material fact about the substantial health risk
to the fetus. The court of appeals determined that the complaining employees had not adequately presented the less-discriminatory-alternatives
issue.' 0 ' The court also found that the employer had established a bona
fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense.103 According to the
Seventh Circuit, industrial safety was part of the essence of the employer's business, and the fetal-protection policy was "reasonably necessary to further that concern."'
In a majority opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court
found the fetal-protection policy to be facially discriminatory since only
women employees were affected. 0 7 The Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's assumption that because defendant's asserted reason for the sexbased exclusion-protecting unconceived offspring-was ostensibly benign, the policy was not sex-based discrimination. 0 8 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the business necessity standard, which applies to facially
neutral practices, was inapplicable.'" According to the Court, "the absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory
102.

Id.

103. Id. at 1201. The Seventh Circuit adopted the three-step business necessity test
from Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984), and Wright v. Olin
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). The Court applied the burden shifting framework established in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 493 U.S. 802 (1989) to require plaintiffs to
bear the burden of persuasion on all of the business necessity steps. 111 S. Ct. at 1200-01.
104. Ill S. Ct. at 1200-01.
105. Id. The BFOQ defense is found in § 703(e)(1) of Title VII which provides in pertinent part:
[lIt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees. . on the basis of. . .religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national original is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988).
106. 111 S. Ct. at 1201.
107. Id. at 1202.
108. Id. at 1203.
109. Id. at 1204.
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policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect." 10 The Court
then turned to the employer's BFOQ defense.
The Supreme Court also found defendant's BFOQ defense deficient.
The Court noted that this defense reaches only special situations in which
discrimination is permissible to "certain instances" in which discrimination is "reasonably necessary" to the "normal operation" of a "particular"
business."' The Court reasoned that each of these terms prevents the use
of general subjective standards and favors objective, verifiable requirements.112 Moreover, the use of the word "occupational," according to the
Court, indicates that the objective and verifiable requirements of this defense must concern job-related skills and aptitudes.'1 3 The Court also rejected the employer's safety concerns because they did not relate to the
women employees themselves or third parties whose safety is essential to
the business of battery operations.1" The Court noted that no one could
disregard the safety of the fetus, but "the BFOQ, is not so broad that it
transforms this deep social concern into an essential aspect of
batterymaking."' 1
Similarly, the Court also noted that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
contains its own BFOQ standard that treatment of pregnant employees
may not differ from that of other employees unless those employees differ
from others "in their ability or inability to work.""' This language means
that women who are as capable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may not be forced to choose between having a child and having a
job. The Court concluded that an employer may not discriminate against
a woman because of her capacity to become pregnant unless her reproductive potential bars her from performing the duties of the job. 1 7 Because there was no evidence that the women could not do the work, they
could not be excluded based upon their ability to have children.
The Supreme Court also considered the potential of employer tort liability because of damage to the fetus, but discounted it because such tort
liability was remote "if the employer fully informs the woman of the risk,
and the employer has not acted negligently."'1 8 Furthermore, even if liability was present, the Court felt that such actions would be preempted

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at
Id. at
Id,
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

1203-04.
1204.
1205.
1206.

Id.
Id. at 1207.

118. Id. at 1208.
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by the mandate of Title VII.1119
The case was remanded to the district
20
court for further proceedings.
C. Proceduraland Evidentiary Matters
Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata. In Richardson v. Alabama
State Board of Education,' 2 the Eleventh Circuit once again examined
the scope of the defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata in a Title
VII action. Plaintiff, a black, uncertified teacher, brought an action under
Title VII and sections 1981 and 1983, against the county board of education alleging that her dismissal, which was based on the fact that she did
not pass the state certification test, was discriminatory.22 The certification test had been the subject of a previously filed class action resulting
in the entry of a consent decree which, inter alia, provided for a permanent injunction against the state board of education preventing use of any
certification exam that has a disparate impact on black teacher candidates. 2 3 Although the consent decree had been approved prior to the
time plaintiff was dismissed, the validity of the decree was not certain
until after plaintiff had been dismissed due to an appeal. The district
court held that plaintiff's action against the county board was not barred
by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel, and determined
24
that plaintiff was entitled to prevail on a disparate impact theory.1
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.12 5 With respect to res judicata, the court of appeals found that the parties to both
actions were not identical as the consent decree action did not direct any
of its extensively detailed remedies at the county board of education.126
Furthermore, the court of appeals agreed with the district court's decision
that plaintiff was seeking redress from a different harm than the class
action suit which spawned the consent decree.1 27 The consent decree dealt
with the flaws in the testing process while plaintiff's action sought reinstatement from the county and back pay, remedies not needed in the consent decree. 2 8 With respect to collateral estoppel, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the issues precluded by entry of the consent decree were lim119. Id. at 1208-09.
120. Id. at 1210.
121. 935 F.2d 1240 (11th.Cir. 1991).
122. Id. at 1242-43.
123. Id. at 1243. Under the terms of the consent decree plaintiff was entitled to certification. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id at 1244.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1244-45,
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ited to those reasonably foreseen at the time of the agreement, and plaintiff's release from her job for failure to pass the certification test was not
reasonably foreseen at the time the consent decree was agreed upon.12'
The court also rejected the county's defense that it had no choice but to
release plaintiff because she had not been certified and Alabama law did
not permit the county to employ an uncertified teacher. The court found
that the county had not sustained its burden of proving that plaintiff
could not have been granted a temporary certificate as had been done in
the past.130 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in International Union
v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,1s1 the Eleventh Circuit suggested that federal
law might preempt that of the state's."'
Administrative Investigations-Subpoena Enforcement. In
EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd.,"' the Eleventh Circuit considered the district court's proper scope of inquiry in a proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena issued by the EEOC. Two charges of discrimination
had been filed against a Bermuda corporation which owns and operates
Bahamian registered cruise ships from its offices in Miami, Florida. 1' In
conducting its administrative investigation, the EEOC requested information relating to defendant's corporate structure and employment practices
ostensibly for the purpose of determining whether it had jurisdiction. 3 s
The district court declined to enforce the subpoena on the ground that
Title VII did not apply to foreign flagged vessels owned by foreign corporations.136 The Eleventh Circuit reversed without deciding the issue of the
jurisdictional reach of Title VIP 3 ' and despite the Supreme Court's recent decision in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co."' s The court of appeals determined that the EEOC was entitled to have its subpoena en39
forced as it had made a colorable assertion that jurisdiction existed.'
Finally, although the Eleventh Circuit indicated that enforcement might
129. Id. at 1246.
130. Id.
131. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
132. 935 F.2d at 1247.
133. 939 F.2d 920 (11th Cir. 1991).
134. Id. at 921.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 922.
137. Id.
138. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
139. 939 F.2d at 922-923. The Eleventh Circuit noted that a district court's role in a
proceeding to enforce a subpoena is very limited, and that the proper scope of inquiry is
whether the material sought by the agency is "material and relevant to a lawful purpose."
Id. at 922 (citing Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); United
States v. Feaster, 376 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 920 (1967); and EEOC
v. Institute of Gas Technology, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 825 (N.D. I1. 1980)).
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be deniable under facts which indicate a clear lack of agency jurisdiction,
the court found that the record in Kloster did not support such a
conclusion. 40
Timeliness of Complaint. Stallworth v. Wells Fargo Armored Services Corp.,"' dealt with the issue of the ninety-day limitation on filing
actions under Title VII. 142 The EEOC had mailed its "right-to-sue" letter

to plaintiff at the address given on her EEOC charge. But the EEOC did
not mail a copy of the letter to plaintiff's attorney as had been requested.1'MThe letter was received by plaintiff's nephew as plaintiff had
temporarily moved from her family home. The nephew never gave plaintiff the EEOC's right-to-sue letter despite the fact that plaintiff checked
for mail at the family home on approximately six occasions during the
month it was received. The district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint
as time-barred, finding that 4 plaintiff had not satisfied her obligation to
1
ensure receipt of the letter.

4

The Eleventh Circuit reversed this determination for two reasons. 4 '
First, the court of appeals found that plaintiff had met her burden under
Lewis v. Connors Steel Co.14 to take "reasonable steps to ensure delivery
of the notice""4

by checking, for the mail six times during the crucial

month "when the family practice [was] to leave the mail in a designated
place. ''1

48

Second, the court concluded that the primary fault for the

failed to mail a copy
failed delivery rested with the EEOC because it1 had
49
of the right-to-sue letter to plaintiff's attorney.
Venue. The Eleventh Circuit was given the opportunity to address the
interplay between the venue provisions in Title VIP 5 and the general
140. Id. at 923.
141. 936 F.2d 522 (11th Cir. 1991).
142. Section 706(0(1) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by the Commission, or if
within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge ... the Commission has not filed a civil action ... or the Commission has not entered into a
conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission
...shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of
such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the
charge ....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
143. 936 F.2d at 523.
144. Id. at 524.
145. Id. at 525.
146. 673 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1982).
147. Id. at 1243.
148. 936 F.2d at 525.
149. id.
150. Section 706(f)(3) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
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federal venue statute' in Richardson v. Alabama State Board of Education.1 5 The county board of education contended that the district court
abused its discretion when it refused to transfer the case from the Middle
District of Alabama to the Northern District of Alabama, where the
county board was located and the alleged harm occurred. 115 The board
contended that transfer was particularly appropriate because the state
board of education had been dismissed as a defendant early in the litigation.' 4 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court's decision not
to transfer the case, even though Title VII's venue provision provides that
the suit could have been filed in the judicial district in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.'" The court
of appeals reasoned that "judicial efficiencies" resided in the middle district because the county board's primary defense was preclusion by virtue
of a case handled by the same district judge, and because the state board
of education was located in the middle district.1'
Pretrial Order. Whether it was caused by error or a tricky attempt
to obtain a jury trial in a Title VII action, the outcome in Walker v.Anderson Electrical Connectors," ' must certainly have been disappointing
to plaintiff. In Walker, plaintiff sued both her employer and her union
claiming that she had been the victim of sexual harassment under the
hostile working environment theory.68 Plaintiff also brought pendent
state tort claims against her employer for invasion of privacy and outrage.
In her complaint, plaintiff sought relief in the form of back-pay, lost benefits, lost seniority, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney fees
and costs for the alleged Title VII violation. 8 9 At the pretrial conference,
[Aln action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained
and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would
have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within
the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1988).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
152. 935 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1991).
153. Id. at 1247-48.
154. Id. at 1248.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 944 F.2d 841 (11th Cir. 1991).
158. Id. at 842.
159. Id.
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however, plaintiff dropped her demand for a declaratory judgment and an
injunction.1s0 Plaintiff's positionstatement was incorporated into the pretrial order by the court. The district court allowed the Title VII claim as
well as the state tort claim for invasion of privacy to be tried before a
jury, since plaintiff was no longer seeking equitable relief and based upon
the district court's earlier decision in Beesley v.The HartfordFire Insurance Co.."'1 Although the jury found for the union, it determined that the
employer had committed acts of sexual harassment against plaintiff and
had invaded plaintiffs privacy. 16 However, the jury found that plaintiff
had suffered no monetary damage.8 As a result of the verdict, the district court entered final judgment ordering that plaintiff take nothing."'
Thereafter, the district court denied plaintiffs posttrial motions for injunctive and declaratory relief, nominal damages, and attorney fees.166
The denial of these motions was the subject of plaintiffs appeal.'
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that it would have
been unjust to the employer to grant plaintiff's post-trial motion for injunctive and declaratory relief.'" The court of appeals recognized that
plaintiff's failure to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief in the pretrial order could have been part of a strategy to achieve a jury trial on the
Title VII issues.16 However, even if this had not been part of plaintiff's
strategy, the Eleventh, Circuit 'agreed that it would be unfair to the employer to give plaintiff relief which was not requested and for which the
employer was never permitted to establish a defense at trial.1 69 The court
also rejected plaintiff's contention that rule 54(c)170 required the court to
grant plaintiff injunctive and declaratory relief even if plaintiff had not
demanded such relief at the pretrial conference.1' The Eleventh Circuit
determined that plaintiff was not "entitled" to such relief as she had
"abandoned this form of relief at the pre-trial conference in favor of
160. Id.
161. Id. at 842-43 (citing Beesley v. The Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 781 (N.D.
Ala. 1989)).
162. Id. at 843.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 843-44.
168. Id. at 843.
169. Id. at 844.
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c) provides in pertinent part: "Except as to a party against whom
a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in the party's pleadings." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
171. 944 F.2d at 844.
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something else, namely a money order."17 According
to the court, rule
''
54(c) does not "sanction this type of maneuvering. 117
JNOV. In Redd v. City of Phenix City, 174 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for JNOV because
defendant had failed to move for a directed verdict at the close of all the
evidence. M The court of appeals rejected as "purely technical" the district court's interpretation of. the advisory note to rule 50(b)1 6 which
states that a motion for JNOV is not proper unless it is preceded by a
motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence. 7 According to the Eleventh Circuit, this requirement
is a "clear and mechani7
cal rule of law" which may not be waived.'1
II. REMEDIES UNDER TITLE VII
A.

Attorney Fees

Three opinions during the survey period addressed different, but interesting issues concerning the award of attorney fees under Title VII. In
Walker v. Anderson Electrical Connectors,7"' the issue concerned
whether plaintiff was a "prevailing party" under section 706(k) of Title
VII. 1" 0 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiff
was not a prevailing party where she had proven sexual harassment but
had failed to obtain any declaratory or monetary relief.1'' Citing Hewitt
v. Helms"12 and Rhodes v. Stewart,"s the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 934 F.2d 1211 (11th Cir. 1991).
175. Id. at 1214.
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a motion for a judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the
evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have
submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Such a motion may be renewed by service and filing
not later than 10 days after entry of judgment ....
FED.

R. Civ. P. 50(b).

177.
178.

934 F.2d at 1214.
Id.

179. 944 F.2d 841 (11th Cir. 1991).
180.

Section 706(k) provides in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding under this

subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission, or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of
the costs . ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988).

181.

944 F.2d at 846.

182.

482 U.S. 755 (1987).
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the jury's finding of sexuals harassment did not alter the legal relationships between the parties.

Richardson v. Alabama State Board of Education' concerned the
propriety of the district court's grant of a 100% enhancement of the lodestar request for attorney fees after it entered judgment for plaintiff. The
enhancement was based on the contingency arrangement between plaintiff and her counsel.' s Deferring to the extremely circumscribed standard
of review accorded to the district court's fact finding in a fee award action, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, with no reservation, the 100% enhancement award.18 7
Turner v. Secretary of the Air Force"'s has to be one of the strangest
attorney fees cases ever decided by the Eleventh Circuit under Title VII.
Plaintiffs, including the NAACP, had prevailed in their class action suit
alleging a pattern and practice of racial discrimination at Eglin Air Force
Base. " A special master recommended that the United States pay
$68,666.25 to "Plaintiffs" for the services of their attorney, Thomas Atkins."' Atkins had participated in the litigation as general counsel to the
National NAACP and the NAACP's Special Contribution Fund for approximately four years, after which he left the employ of the NAACP but
continued to act as plaintiff's counsel in the litigation along with several
local attorneys. ' The district court adopted the special master's report,
but erroneously awarded the fees directly to plaintiffs' attorneys, including Atkins, rather than to plaintiffs themselves. 11 Three months after the
district court entered its award, and after the fees had been "paid by the
United States, the NAACP petitioned to have the judgment reconsidered
pursuant to rule 60(b). 11" The district court granted this motion and
eventually adopted a second report of the special master which recommended that,$21,156.25 of the fees be paid directly to the NAACP for the
183. 488 U.S. 1 (1988).
184. 944 F.2d at 847.
185. 935 F.2d 1240 (lth Cir. 1991).
186. Id. at 1248.
187. Id.
188. 944 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1991).
189. Id. at 806.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides in relevant part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a
party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect ....
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for ...
FED.

(1) ...

not more

than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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services of Atkins while he was a salaried employee of that
organization. 19
On appeal, Atkins argued that rule 60 did not apply, the NAACP motion was untimely, the award to the NAACP violated the ethical prohibition on attorneys splitting fees with non-attorneys, and that the district
court erred by using an hourly rate of $125 rather than $200 in the calculation of attorney fees for his services.196 The Eleventh Circuit rejected
each of Atkins' contentions. 196 First, the court determined that rule 60(b)
was applicable as the district court, in granting the NAACP's motion,
stated that it had erred in not ordering that fees be paid to the prevailing
party."' Second, the court found that inasmuch as rule 60(b)(1) provides
that motions thereunder must be made within one year of the order entered, the NAACP's motion was timely."' Third, the court reasoned that
since the plain language of section 706(k)'" "specifically authorizes the
award of attorneys' fees to a 'prevailing party'" the fee award did not
violate the ethical prohibition on fee-splitting because the NAACP is not
a law firm and Atkins himself is not splitting his fees with non-attorneys.2" Finally, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's use of
the lower hourly rate, deferring to the district court's discretion under the
2 01
clearly erroneous standard.
B. Mitigation
In Weaver v. Casa Gallardo,Inc.,20 2 the Eleventh Circuit addressedthe
proper remedies available to a victim of race discrimination under Title
VII. Specifically, the Court was faced with whether plaintiff had properly
mitigated his damages by using reasonable diligence to find substantially
equivalent employment, and whether front pay in addition to back pay
was properly awarded to plaintiff.208 Plaintiff alleged, and the district
court found, that his employer failed to promote him on three occasions
and later, in retaliation for his charge of discrimination, terminated him
from his middle management position. Following his discharge, plaintiff
waited approximately five months before seeking substantially equivalent

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

944 F.2d at 806.
Id.
Id. at 807-09.
Id. at 807.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5(k) (1988).
944 F.2d at 807-08.
Id. at 808 (citing Martin v. University of South Alabama, 911 F.2d 604 (11th Cir.

1990)).
202. 922 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1991).
203. Id. at 1526.
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work. Eventually, he took a management trainee position at a base salary
of approximately half what he was earning with defendant. He voluntarily
left that job after six months because of financial pressures and old
debts.2 0' Although the district court held that plaintiff had failed to reasonably mitigate his damages during the five month period following his
discharge, the district court held that plaintiff had not failed to mitigate
his damages by leaving the management trainee position because it was
not "virtually identical" to the position plaintiff held with defendant 20 6
Based upon this conclusion, the district court determined that plaintiff
had not forfeited his right to back pay when he left the management
trainee position.2 6 With respect to front pay, the district court awarded
plaintiff three years of damages at plaintiff's base salary from the date of
0
the judgment.2 7
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiff had
not failed to mitigate his damages when he voluntarily resigned from the
management trainee position.20 8 But the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
award of front pay on the grounds that the district court had not stated
any reason why plaintiff should not have been able to work his way up
from a management trainee to a supervisory position in the three-year
period preceding the date of the judgment.' 0 ' According to the Eleventh
Circuit, front pay is proper "only when the other damages awarded will
not fully compensate the plaintiff for his injury."'1 0 The "make whole"
purposes of Title VII had already been achieved through the award of
back pay which had reflected a "modest" .reduction for failure to
mitigate.'
C. Nominal Damages
In Walker v. Anderson Electrical Connectors,"1 ' a case of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit, the court was asked to decide whether thefinding of a Title VII violation requires the automatic award of nominal
damages. The case, which was tried before a jury, resulted in a finding of
sexual harassment but no award of damages.213 The district court had not
instructed the jury on the possibility of awarding nominal damages and
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 1527.
Id. at 1528.
Id.
Id. at 1529.
Id. at 1528.
Id. at 1529.
Id.
Id.
944 F.2d 841 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 843.
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plaintiff had not requested a charge on nominal damages.' 14 The Eleventh
5 which manCircuit rejected plaintiff's argument that Carey v. Piphus,"1
dated the award of nominal damages upon a finding of a due process violation under section 1983 where no actual injury had been shown, was
applicable to Title VII actions."' The court of appeals reasoned that a
violation of purely statutory rights under Title VII, as compared to a violation of 'constitutional rights, does not require the award of nominal
damages217

III. AGE DIScRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
A. Coverage Under the Act
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit issued
many notable decisions, on age discrimination during the survey period.
Three of the- cases help to further define the scope and coverage of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). ss
In Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,s 9 the United States Supreme Court grappled with the issue of whether an arbitration clause
contained in a stock exchange registration agreement could obligate a former employee bringing suit under the Act, to submit his claim to arbitration and not a court of law. Plaintiff, a sixty-two year old employee of
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., was discharged from his position as a registered securities representative.220 As a condition of his employment,
plaintiff had been required to register with the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE").2 The NYSE registration application stated that plaintiff
would be bound by the arbitration provisions set forth in the NYSE
rules.22 One of the issues which was required to be submitted to arbitration under the NYSE rules was any controversy arising out of a registered
representative's employment or termination of employment ."'
Plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina asserting that his termination constituted a
214.
215.

Id. at 845.
435 U.S. 247 (1978).

216. 944 F.2d at 845.
217. Id. In doing so the Eleventh Circuit questioned the validity of Hicks v. Brown
Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
944 F.2d at 845 n.9.

218. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1988)).
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
Id. at 1651.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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violation of the ADEA.2' Defendant moved to compel arbitration of
plaintiff's discrimination claim upon the basis of the arbitration clause as
well as the Federal Arbitration Act.225 The district court, however, denied
defendant's motion after concluding that the Supreme Court's determination in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,226 required it to determine that
Congress intended to protect ADEA claimants from the potential waiver
of their right to a judicial forum by signing arbitration agreements.22' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, reversed,
after finding no congressional intent to preclude the enforcement of arbitration agreements existing in either the ADEA or its legislative history.2"s The Supreme Court, noting that the various circuits were divided
concerning the propriety of arbitrating ADEA claims, granted
certiorari.'

s9

In affirming the ruling of the Fourth Circuit, the Court rejected plaintiffs claim that the arbitration of ADEA claims would thwart the furtherance of important social policies contemplated by the Act because as
"long as the prospective litigant [could] effectively. . . vindicate [his or
her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute [would]
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function. 230 The Court
also rejected plaintiff's assertion that arbitration would diminish the role
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in addressing age discrimination claims, noting that the EEOC still had the
power to investigate such claims,'3 1 that a claimant also retained the right
to file a charge with the EEOC even if he was forced to arbitrate his
claim,22 2 and that in any event, the language of the Act actually appeared
to be consistent with the allowance of a form of alternative dispute reso2
lution, such as arbitration.'

3

The Court also discarded plaintiffs attacks upon the procedural inadequacies of arbitration of ADEA claims.2 3' 4 Plaintiff had asserted that arbitrators are likely to have an inherent bias favoring the employer, however,
the Court stated that such an assertion constituted nothing more than
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
111 S. Ct. at 1651.

228. Id.
229. Id. at 1653.
230. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 (1985)).
231. Id.

232. Id. at 1653-54.
233. Id. at 1654.
234.

Id. at 1654-1655.
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unfounded suspicion23 and that procedural safeguards, such as those contained in the NYSE arbitration rules allowed for the challenging and removal of an arbitrator upon the basis of bias." Plaintiff also claimed that
the limited discovery allowed in arbitration, as opposed to federal court,
made it more onerous to prove age discrimination."37 In response, the
Court stated that similar claims could be made regarding the arbitration
of RICO, antitrust, and securities regulations claims, yet those claims are
submittable to arbitration.2" Moreover, the Court stated that in the case
at bar, the assertion of a lack of adequate discovery devices or written
arbitration opinions could not be rationally maintained due to the fact
that the NYSE rule provisions allowed for the service of document production requests, information requests, subpoenas, the taking of deposi9
tions, and required the publication of written opinions."
Plaintiff's claim that the enforcement of arbitration agreements relating to ADEA claims would result in unequal bargaining power between
employers and employees was also rejected.240 The Court stated that the
mere fact that the employer may possess greater bargaining power did
not, in and of itself, constitute a sufficient basis for not enforcing arbitration agreements in the employment context.'" The Court noted previous
decisions involving similar enforceable arbitration agreements which the
Court had upheld and further stated that it found no unfair bargaining
advantage present in this. case." On the contrary, the Court noted that
plaintiff was an experienced businessman who had freely signed the arbitration clause.'

Plaintiff's final assertion contended that the Court's previous opinions
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,2" Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
6
Freight System, Inc.,2" and McDonald v. City of West Branch"2
pre7
cluded the Court from permitting arbitration of ADEA claims." The
Court stated that plaintiff's reliance upon Gardner-Denver and its progeny was misplaced because those cases concerned the enforceability of
arbitration clauses contained in collective bargaining agreements involv-

235.

Id. at 1654.

236. Id.
237,

Id.

238. Id.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 1655.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1655-56.
Id. at 1656.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
450 U.S. 728 (1981).
466 U.S. 284 (1984).
111 S. Ct. at 1656.
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ing numerous employees: who were represented by a union, as opposed to
plaintiff's arbitration agreement, which constituted a single contract
which plaintiff was free to negotiate on his own.2' The Court further
stated that the Gardner-Denverline of cases involved the different issue
of whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial determination of statutory claims, an issue which was not present
in this action.2 49 Upon these bases, the Court found that arbitration of
plaintiff's ADEA claim was permissible.'
In Gregory v. Ashcroft," 1 the Supreme Court considered whether the
Missouri Constitution's mandatory retirement provision was violative of
the ADEA as applied to state court judges. Pursuant to Article V, Section
26 of the Missouri Constitution,' Plaintiffs, four state court judges, were
subject to mandatory retirement upon reaching the age of seventy. 6 The
retirement provision states that "[a]ll judges other than municipal judges
shall retire at the age of seventy years."!2 " All four plaintiffs were gubernatorial appointees and had remained in office by virtue of a simple retention election.2" Plaintiffs filed suit against Governor John D. Ashcroft
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
alleging that the mandatory retirement provision violated the ADEA.' 66
The district court dismissed the action upon findingthat plaintiffs were
appointees "upon a policymaking level" and thus not included within the
Act's definition of the term "employee." 2587 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.2
On appeal, the Supreme Court. noted that the federal government, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,"5' had
the power to impose its will upon the states and otherwise regulate areas
traditionally considered to be regulable only by the states as sovereign
governments.21 The Court, however, also noted that the federal government should exercise the Supremacy Clause only in extraordinary instances."' The Court recognized that Congress has traditionally been ex-
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tremely wary of intruding upon this type of regulation, and that a state's
decision to establish qualifications for its judges "is a decision of the most
fundamental sort of a sovereign entity." 2 2 Accordingly, the Court ruled
that it would not intervene absent some clear congressional intent to alter
the traditional balance of power between the federal and state
governments.'
The Court then noted that Congress had extended the substantive provisions of the ADEA to include states as employers " 4 and that pursuant
to its ruling in EEOC v. Wyoming,' " the extension of the ADEA to employment by both state and local governments has been held to be a valid
exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 2" The Court
thereafter reviewed the ADEA's definition of "employee" and found that
whether Congress intended for appointed state court judges to be included under the Act could not be clearly ascertained. 6 The Court
stated that in the absence of any clear legislative intent, the plain statement rule precluded it from invalidating the State's retirement
provision.2 8
In Fountain i. Metcalf, Zima & Company, P.A.,2 the Eleventh Circuit
answered the question of whether a member/shareholder of a professional
corporation was a partner instead of an employee capable of bringing an
action against his employer for violating the. ADEA. Plaintiff, a former
member/shareholder of the accounting firm of Metcalf, Zima & Company,
P.A., brought suit after being discharged from employment.2 70 Plaintiff
contended that as an employee, his discharge constituted a violation of
the ADEA 2 7 1 Defendant claimed that plaintiff, as a2 partner,
not an em72
ployee, was not entitled to bring suit under the Act.
The district court found in favor of defendant after it considered that
plaintiff was one of only four member/shareholders; 7 3 that he owned
thirty-one percent of the outstanding stock of the professional association;217' that the four member/shareholders were all referred to as partners
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by both clients and employees, as well as each other; 7 5 that unlike an
employee, plaintiff shared in the profits, losses and expenses of the
firm;276 that he, unlike an employee, was jointly and severally liable for
the debts of the firm; 7 7 and finally, that unlike an employee, plaintiff

possessed shares in the professional association which he was allowed to
vote regarding issues of the firm's continued operation and
8
7

capitalization.2

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the issue of whether a
member/shareholder of a professional association is an employee entitled
to bring suit under the ADEA was a question of first impression in the
Circuit.2 7' Nonetheless, it pointed out that the Supreme Court in Oscar
Mayer & Co. v. Evans,200 recognized that both the ADEA and Title VII
were similar in application and that other circuits, as well as the Eleventh
Circuit, had decided the issue of whether an2 individual bringing suit
under Title VII was a partner or an employee.

5'

The court reflected upon the Supreme Court's decision in Hishon v.
8
King & Spalding,'2
involving a similar claim brought under Title VII.288
In Hishon, plaintiff alleged that the partners of the firm were the functional equivalents of employees of a corporation.2 " The Eleventh Circuit
noted that while the Court's majority opinion 'was not dispositive of the
present issue, Justice Powell's concurrence did mention that for the purposes of Title VII, partners would not be considered employees.2 5
Upon the basis of Powell's concurrence, the Eleventh Circuit scrutinized the Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd,2" and the
Second Circuit's decision in Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, s7 both of which discussed whether member/shareholders of a professional association were either partners or employees under Title VII.2 88

The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Hyland rationale because it distinguished employees from partners upon the basis of the form of the busi275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id,
441 U.S. 750 (1979).

281. 925 F.2d at 1399.
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284. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
285. 925 F.2d at 1400 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984) (Powell,
J., concurring)).
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ness entity without conducting an analysis of the facts and circumstances
in formulating its determination.' The Eleventh Circuit, in refusing to
exalt form over substance, followed the reasoning of Dowd, which found
member/shareholders were more analogous to partners than employees
for the purposes of Title VII.29 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court and stated that the "economic reality" of the matter was that plaintiff was a partner."91
B.

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

2
Disparate Impact. In MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, "'
the Eleventh Circuit considered its only ADEA case involving a disparate
impact theory. Plaintiffs, two professors at the College of Business at the
University of Montevallo, claimed that the University was discriminating
against them with respect to their compensation because of their age." 83
Plaintiffs asserted that the University's practice of paying higher current
market rates to newly hired professors without matching such rates to
professors already on the faculty, had a disparate impact on older professors who had been on the staff the longest."O' Plaintiffs demonstrated that
although they were two of the three longest-serving professors on the
University faculty, they were nonetheless the lowest paid professors at
the college of business holding terminal degrees.29 After the presentation
of all the evidence at trial, the district court granted a directed verdict for
9
the University.2 '
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.297 Citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Antonio," the court noted that plaintiffs did not sustain their burden of
establishing that the University's hiring and compensation practices created a disparate impact.2' 9 While the Eleventh Circuit did find that plaintiffs had established that the University employed a practice of paying
newly hired professors market-rate salaries, plaintiffs failed to show that
the University also employed a practice of denying established professors
market-based salary adjustments.8 0 ' The court further noted that even if
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plaintiffs had been able to satisfy their initial burden of proving that the
University was employing such a discriminatory practice, the University
had, in any event, demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business
reason for its practice. 01 The court opined that the University's contention that it was necessary to pay market rates to prospective faculty
members in order to compete with other universities was wholly undisputed.302 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that plaintiffs
had not shown that the University's reasons for its practice were pretextual, nor did they suggest any viable alternatives to offering competitive
salaries which would entice new hires but
would not have a disparate im08
pact upon the older faculty members.
Disparate Treatment. Plaintiffs in MacPherson v. University of
MontevaIo 3" also brought suit against the University alleging that its
compensation- scheme constituted disparate treatment in violation of the
ADEA."0 Plaintiffs' disparate treatment claim reached a jury which
found in their favor and awarded damages. The University thereafter
moved for JNOV, or in the alternative, a new trial, which the district
court granted. 06
In deciding to vacate the JNOV but affirm the decision to conduct a
new trial, the Eleventh Circuit noted that reasonable minds could disagree as to whether the University was culpable of disparate treatment
under the facts.307 After reviewing the respective burdens of the parties,
the Eleventh Circuit noted that plaintiffs had established that a prima
facie case of age discrimination existed due to the disparity between the
salaries of plaintiffs and their colleagues at the University. 8 While the
Eleventh Circuit also noted that the University had postulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its salary differentials, 0' it nonetheless
found that certain evidence offered at trial did cast doubt upon whether
the University's reasons for this disparity were legitimate or merely
pretextual, 1 0 and thus it determined that reasonable factfinders could be
capable of disagreement concerning the validity of the University's justifications for its compensation scheme.311 Because the court concluded that
301.

Id.

302. Id. at 772-73.
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this question was appropriately the province of a jury, it vacated the district court's grant of JNOV 8 1'
In Elrod v. Sears & Roebuck & Co., 318 the Eleventh Circuit was again
confronted with the question of whether a district court's ruling upon a
motion for JNOV was properly entered upon a claim of disparate treatment brought under the ADEA. Plaintiff was a fifty-one year old male
who had given twenty-two years of service to Sears prior to his termination." Since 1982 plaintiff had been employed as the manager of the
Jacksonville Credit Central Office in Jacksonville; Florida31 He was discharged from his employment with Sears after the company determined
that he had engaged in sexually harassing conduct toward female coworkers. 1 6
Before the district court, plaintiff contended that he had been discharged upon the basis of his age81 7 and that the allegations of his involvement in any sexually harassing conduct were merely a pretext to
camouflage Sear's decision to replace him with younger, "career oriented"
employees who had been'displaced when Sears closed its territorial office
in Atlanta, Georgia. " Sears, by contrast, contended that it had sternly
placed plaintiff on notice that it would not tolerate sexual harassment of
its employees after the company discovered that plaintiff had undertaken
such acts, but that despite such warnings, plaintiff refused to exhibit satisfactory behavior, and was, upon that basis alone, terminated from employment 1 9 The jury found in favor of plaintiff. 20 The district court denied Sears' motion for a JNOV 2 ' Sears appealed contending that this
822
ruling was in error.
Pointing to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 2 ' the Eleventh Circuit
noted that while plaintiff had satisfied the criteria for establishing a
prima facie case of disparate treatment, he had nonetheless failed to
demonstrate that Sears' business motivations behind its decision to terminate him were pretextual.32 ' The court pointed out that uncontradicted
evidence existed to show that the officials at Sears who were responsible
312.
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for plaintiff's discharge reasonably believed that he had sexually harassed
women at the Jacksonville office 3 and that their decision to terminate
was a reasonable course of action to prevent the possibility of Sears' liability in a Title VII context if the victims of the harassment chose to file
charges. 2 ' The Eleventh Circuit further noted that plaintiff adduced no
evidence to challenge Sears' claim that it had fired him for sexual harassment, 32 7 or in support, of his claim that the real motivation behind his
discharge was due to his age. 31 For these reasons the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that Sears' motion for JNOV was inappropriately denied.32 '
In Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,330 the Eleventh Circuit once more
addressed the issue of whether Sears was guilty of disparate treatment in
violation of the ADEA. However, in Alphin, the underlying facts and the
ultimate determination were markedly different. Plaintiff had been an
employee of Sears since 1956.331 At age fifty he was discharged from his
position as sales manager of the home appliances division of a Sears store
3 32
in Pensacola, Florida.

Plaintiff brought suit under the ADEA, contending that he had been
discharged solely upon the basis of his age. 833 After exhausting his administrative remedies, plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida.33 ' At trial, plaintiff testified that his
immediate supervisor had commented upon the fact that he thought
plaintiff was "too old" and "making too much money," and that the reasons Sears proffered for his discharge were purely pretextual.13 Sears, by
contrast, argued that it legitimately terminated plaintiff for poor job performance and moved for summary judgment.33 ' The district court granted
Sears' motion after stating that plaintiff had failed to establish any direct
evidence of discrimination and that it did not believe that plaintiff would
be capable of proving such discrimination upon the basis of his circumstantial evidence.
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In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit noted that while plaintiff had failed
to establish direct evidence of discrimination, 8 8 he had nevertheless adduced a sufficient amount of circumstantial evidence to meet his burden
of demonstrating a prima facie case of age discrimination.33 Plaintiff had
shown that he was a member of a protected class, that he was qualified
for the job, and he had further submitted testimonial evidence from
which a factfinder could conclude that he had been discriminated against
because of his age.3 ' 0 Upon the basis of this evidence, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff
had been subjected to age discrimination existed and that the district
court's entry of summary judgment was therefore improper.3"
C. ProceduralMatters
Timely Charge. In Stevens v. Department of Treasury,'4 the Supreme Court ruled upon the issue of whether an employee of the Internal
Revenue Service had timely filed his claim of age discrimination with the
EEOC so as to preserve his right to bring suit under the ADEA. Plaintiff,
believing that his demotion on April 26, 1987 constituted age discrimination, attempted, in September of 1987, to invoke the Agency's administrative procedures. 48 Plaintiff's attempt to obtain agency review was initiated more than 'thirty days after the occurrence of the alleged
discriminatory act, and thus was in derogation of the thirty day time
limit required by EEOC regulations. 44 Nonetheless, on October 19, 1987,
plaintiff filed an administrative complaint against the Department of
Treasury and stated his notice of intent to sue if the administrative adjudication was not favorable.8 40 The EEOC rejected his complaint as being
untimely and on May 3, 1988, plaintiff filed his complaint in district
court.3'

6

The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice upon finding
that plaintiff had not timely filed his action under the ADEA.347 The
court found that section 633a(d) mandated that plaintiff initiate action
no later than 180 days from the occurrence of the alleged unlawful activ338. Id.
339.
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ity and notify the EEOC within thirty days prior to bringing suit.3 , 8 The
court noted that more than 180 days had passed since the April 26, 1987
demotion and the filing of plaintiff's action in the district court on May 3,
1988,' °
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court had misapplied section 633a(d). 3" The court stated that plaintiff was only required
to file his notice of intent to sue within 180 days and that he was not
required to file suit within that period.8 1 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit found that because plaintiff did not initiate his suit until May 3,
1988, more than thirty days had passed from the filing
of his notice of
85
intent to sue and therefore, such notice was untimely. 2
The Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh Circuit had also misapplied section 633a(d).8 8 The Court stated that while the Eleventh Circuit
had appropriately interpreted the section regarding the 180 day period
from the discriminatory event and the filing of the notice to sue, it nonetheless had misinterpreted the requirement that plaintiff notify the
EEOC not less than thirty days prior to initiating suit.3" The Court
stated that the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation requiring plaintiffs' action to commence within thirty days of his notice to the EEOC was incorrect. 38 Instead, the Court stated that section 633a(d) only required notice
not less than thirty days before commencing suitV5" Therefore, the Court
held that since plaintiff's commencement of suit was filed well over thirty
days after the date of his notice to the EEOC, his charge was timely
filed.-5 7
Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel. In Astoria Federal Savings &
Loan v. Solimino,3s5 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
judicially unreviewed state administrative proceedings have a preclusive
effect upon age discrimination proceedings in a federal court. As in Greg8 the Court referred to the plain statement rule in interory v. Ashcroft,3
preting the congressional intent of the ADEA; 600 however, in Astoria a
348.
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vastly different result was reached. Plaintiff filed a charge of age discrimination against his employer with the EEOC.6 1 Pursuant to a worksharing
agreement, plaintiff's charge was transferred to the Division of Human
Rights of the State of New York."' The Division of Human Rights found
the charge to be without merit.3 6 Subsequent administrative review upheld the Division's findings.3" Rather than appealing the administrative
rulings in state court, plaintiff chose instead to pursue his claim in the
district court."' The district court held that the administrative finding
that no age discrimination had occurred precluded it from litigating the
matter. 36 However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, stating that the congressional intent of the ADEA created an inference that federal review of
intended to be barred by the findings of a state administhe Act was not
3
trative agency. 17
On appeal' the Supreme Court ruled that the ADEA implies that federal courts are not precluded from reviewing state administrative findings
regarding age discrimination claims brought under the ADEA.'" Unlike
its decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft,' 9 the Court stated that Congress need
not expressly state an intention to overcome a presumption of administrative estoppel because the requirements of the plain statement rule
"prevail only to the protection of applicable weighty and constant values. '37 Finding that such factors were not present in this case, the Court
noted that it was only necessary to determine whether administrative
preclusion would be inconsistent with the intent of Congress in framing
the ADEA.371 Reviewing sections 14(b) and 7(d)(2) of the Act, the Court
ruled that both sections contemplated the possibility of review by a federal court after adjudication by a state agency. 3 72 Finding no preclusion,
the Court remanded the action to the district court for determination. 7s
JNOV. The Eleventh Circuit issued three opinions during the survey
period which concerned motions for JNOV in ADEA actions. In Elrod v.
Sears & Roebuck Co.,3 7 " the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court
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had erred in upholding a jury verdict for plaintiff on his claim that his
termination from employment was based upon his age.8 75 In overturning
the district court's ruling, the Eleventh Circuit applied a de novo standard of review 76
. The court acknowledged that when considering motions for JNOV that
a district court was bound to construe all the evidence in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. 77 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that motions for JNOV "need not be reserved for situations where
there is a complete absence of facts to support a jury verdict. ' ' 78 Instead,
the court stated that where the facts and inferences were of such an overwhelming weight that reasonable people could not draw a contrary conclusion, then a motion for JNOV should be granted.8 7 In assessing the
facts adduced before the district court, the court found that plaintiff had
not presented acceptable evidence to demonstrate that Sears' decision to
fire him for sexually harassing conduct was pretextual. 80 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and held that its denial of
Sears' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict Was erroneous. 881
In MacPherson v. University of Montevallo,88 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of a motion for JNOV in favor of the
University. 83 The University moved for JNOV or in the alternative, a
new trial after receiving an adverse jury verdict finding in favor of plaintiffs upon their disparate treatment claim. 8' The district court granted
both motions. 88 5 The Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case for age discrimination and had cast shadows of
doubt upon the legitimacy of the University's facially nondiscriminatory
reasons for the disparities in professors' salaries 80 The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that reasonable men were capable of disagreeing upon the basis of such evidence and ruled that it was error for the district court to set
aside the jury's finding and grant defendant's motion for JNOV.887
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In what will no doubt be considered one of the most poorly decided
district court opinions reviewed by the court of appeals in the survey pe3e
riod, the Eleventh Circuit, in Wilson v. S & L Acquisition Co., L.P., 8
reviewed a grant of JNOV and found it to be in error. Plaintiff was a
fifty-nine year old assistant group supervisor for Essanelle Beauty Salons."' She was formerly a group supervisor for Essanelle salons in the
Birmingham, Alabama area earning $25,000 per year. Plaintiff was essentially forced to accept a lesser position of assistant group supervisor for
Essanelle salons located in Rich's Department Stores throughout the Atlanta, Georgia region. 3 0 At the time plaintiff accepted the job, she was
informed that while her status had been reduced, her salary and corporate benefits would remain the same2°9
Shortly after arriving in Atlanta, plaintiff was asked to accept the posi3
tion of salon manager at an Atlanta, Georgia Nieman Marcus Store. 92
The move to salon manager from assistant group supervisor constituted
yet another substantial reduction in her status. Plaintiff agreed to accept
the position provided that she would retain her salary, medical benefits,
and vacation pay. 93 The following day, plaintiff was fired as assistant
group supervisor of the Rich's group of stores.314
Approximately one month later she was rehired as salon manager of the
Essanelle in the Nieman Marcus Store, but at a greatly reduced salary of
$18,000 per year.395 Plaintiff became dissatisfied with her situation and
gave her employer notice of her intent to resign and told Essanelle that
she would continue to work until it could replace her.3 9" In response, Espresident in charge of the Nieman Marcus account fired
sanelle's vice
97
plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama 38 alleging, among various other charges, 39 ' that she
had been constructively discharged by Essanelle, which had discriminated
388. 940 F.2d 1429 (11th Cir. 1991).
389. Id. at 1431.
390. Id. Southeastern Regional Vice President, Carol Cona, asked plaintiff to choose between the assistant group supervisor position in Atlanta, Georgia or a position as salon manager at a Birmingham, Alabama Essanelle Store. However, no salon manager position in the
Birmingham area was open at the time and plaintiff thus chose her only remaining option.
391. Id.
392. Id. Soon after plaintiff moved to Atlanta, Georgia, pursuant to her agreement with
Regional Vice President Carol Cona, Cona was replaced by Chris Webster.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 1432. Plaintiff was informed by other Essanelle employees that she had been
discharged upon the basis of her age.
397. Id.
398. Id.
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against her upon the basis of her age.' 00 Plaintiff emerged victorious on
her age discrimination claim after a lengthy jury trial.401 The jury
awarded plaintiff a total of $49,312 on her ADEA claim, representing
back pay, lost wages, and liquidated damages.'0 ' Essanelle promptly
moved for JNOV, or in the alternative, a motion for new trial, or remittitur of the ADEA claim.' 05 Plaintiff countered by moving for reinstatement, front pay, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees. 40' The district
court conducted an oral hearing on these motions which was not
transcribed.0 5
The district court orally informed the parties that it was inclined to
grant the motion for JNOV on the constructive discharge claim; however,
it was willing to let the jury verdict stand if plaintiff would accept remittitur of her age claim up to $75,089." The district court stated that the
$75,089 figure would consist of $28,000 in front pay, $42,000 in back pay
and liquidated damages, and $5,089 in lost benefits.' 07 Plaintiff accepted
the terms of the remittitur based on the district court's oral representations at the hearing. However, when the district court issued its written
order a few months later, the court granted Essanelle's motion for JNOV,
stating that it found that plaintiff had not been constructively discharged
but rather, willfully demoted. 408 The district court's ruling totally disallowed plaintiff's awards of front pay, lost benefits, and liquidated damages and also significantly reduced her back pay award to $2,333.33."
Plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit found substantial evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that plaintiff's discharge was based upon her age and that
Essanelle's purported reasons were pretextual. 410 The court reversed the
399. Id. Plaintiff also brought suit under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, alleging sexual discrimination, and Georgia law, alleging fraudulent inducement.
400. 940 F.2d at 1432.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1432-33.
404. Id. at 1433.
405. Id. The court of appeals found that the district court's statement that it was in-

clined to find that the jury had erred in considering the constructive discharge claim was,
taken alone, a tacit acknowledgement of iusintention to grant defendant's motion for
JNOV.
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JNOV and criticized the district court's decision to set aside the jury's
verdict as being clearly erroneous."
New Trial. In MacPherson v. University of Montevallo,"" the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's grant of the University's alternative motion for new trial.' s Plaintiffs, who had successfully obtained a
jury verdict upon their disparate treatment claim, argued that the granting of a new trial constituted an abuse of discretion.' 1 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the reasoning behind the district court's decision and held
that the district court's concern about the jury's confusion between the
disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, as well as the testimony
of plaintiff's expert witness, constituted reasonable grounds for granting a
new trial.'4" The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a
new trial and held that a great degree of deference should be accorded to
the district court since it alone had the opportunity to observe how the
jury interpreted the evidence and witnesses brought forth during the
6
trial.41
Jury Instructions. In Wilson v. S & L Acquisition Co., L.P.,' the
Eleventh Circuit commented that the district court's entry of JNOV upon
its finding that plaintiff had not been constructively discharged, but simply discharged or willfully demoted, was clearly in error due to the fact
that the jury had never been instructed on the issues of actual discharge
18
or willful demotion.'

IV.

REHABILITATION ACT OF

1973

Though not nearly as broad in scope as the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"),'419 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is the progenitor of the
ADA, and has had a strong influence on the ADA. During the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit was called upon to review two cases in which
plaintiffs had asserted claims of discrimination under the Rehabilitation
0
Act.'2
411.

Id.

412.
413.
414.

922 F.2d 766 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 776.
Id.

415.

Id. at 776-77.

416.

Id. at 777.

417.

940 F.2d 1429 (11th Cir. 1991).

418. Id. at 1436. The court of appeals found that the district court had submitted interrogatories to the jury along with the verdict form but these interrogatories only concerned
constructive discharge, not willful demotion.
419. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990)).
420. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990)).
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Coverage Under the Act

In Moore v. Sun Bank of North Florida,'2 1 the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the federal financial assistance provision of section 504 2 of the
Rehabilitation Act"8 as including a national bank's participation in the
Small Business Administration's (SBA) guaranteed loan program. The
district court held that the defendant bank was covered by the Act and
against the handicapped
therefore liable for employment discrimination
25
plaintiff.'24 The Eleventh Circuit agreed.'

Defendant argued that its participation in the SBA guaranteed loan
program did not subject it to coverage under section 504 because Congress intended contracts of insurance or guarantee to be excluded from
the definition of federal financial assistance. 42 6 In support of this argument, defendant referred to section'602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,47 sections 902 and 905 of Title XI of the Higher Education Act
of 1965,42' and section 304(a)(4) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,4 20 each of which specifically exclude recipients of federal financial assistance who receive benefits from contracts of insurance
or guarantee."" Defendant also relied upon the legislative history of the
1978 amendments to section 504 which incorporated the remedies, procedures, and rights of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.41 Finally,
defendant relied upon regulations promulgated by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare which excluded contracts of insurance or
guarantee from the definition of federal financial assistance."
The court of appeals rejected defendant's arguments reasoning that if
Congress intended to exclude contracts of insurance and guarantee from
the definition of federal financial assistance in section 504, it could have
inserted language in the Act, but it failed to do so thereby indicating its
intent to include such contracts in the coverage of the law. 4 The court
also rejected defendant's argument that the legislative history of the 1978
amendments supported defendant's position.' 3 ' The court noted that the
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

923 F.2d 1423 (11th Cir. 1991).
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96i (1988).
923 F.2d at 1424.
Id.

426. Id. at 1425.
427.
428.
429.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1682, 1685 (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(4) (1988).

430. 923 F.2d at 1425.
431. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(c) (1988).
432. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h).
433. 923 F.2d at 1429.
434. Id.
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1978 amendments have been recognized by the Supreme Court as expanding, rather than limiting, the applicability of the Act.' Finally, the
Eleventh Circuit simply refused to defer to the administrative regulations
and the agency's interpretation of the Act.' 6
The Court also found the defendant to be covered by the Act with respect to defendant's separate argument that even assuming, arguendo,
that contracts of insurance or guarantee constitute federal financial assistance within the meaning of section 504, it was not a "recipient" of federal funds and therefore not covered by the Act.4' 7 The Eleventh Circuit

noted that under the terms of the underlying grant statute, federal funds
are directly reimbursed to the lending institution under the SBA guaranteed loan program upon default by the borrower, and in this respect defendant was determined to be a recipient within the meaning of the
4
Act. 3

B. Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof
In Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control District/s the Eleventh
Circuit had to determine whether an HIV-positive firefighter had been
terminated from his job upon the basis of his handicap in violation of
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff, Paul Severino, was informed in September of 1987 that his blood had registered HIV-positive
for AIDS." 0 Severino tendered his resignation to his employer, Chief
Brown of the North Ft. Myers Fire Control District. Brown, however, successfully convinced Severino not to quit but to simply switch from
firefighting to light duty work. Plaintiff's switch to light duty status enabled him to maintain his previous salary and his insurance benefits, but
he was no longer permitted to perform rescue duties as a firefighter."
Plaintiff's new duties consisted of working dispatch, maintaining the
equipment, and running errands, all of which plaintiff found to be
demeaning. 44 As time passed, Severino became more discontent and refused to perform his light duty functions." 3 In March 1988, the Fire Dis435.
436.
437.
438.

Id.
Id. at 1430-31.
Id. at 1431.
Id. at 1432.

439.

935 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1991).

440. Id. at 1180.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. Plaintiff also became litigation oriented. He collected large amounts of medical
and legal literature on AIDS and informed at least one individual that he intended to sue
someone.
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trict placed plaintiff on a ninety day medical leave."' Defendant terminated plaintiff on May 24, 1988, in fear that it would be forced to provide
plaintiff with a salary indefinitely when he refused to perform the light
duties offered to him." Severino subsequently brought suit under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, contending that his termination was based
upon the fact he had tested HIV-positive for AIDS.'" The district court
found in favor of the fire district after determining that the defendant
had made an honest effort to reasonably accommodate plaintiff, but that
plaintiff's own behavior had provided the impetus for his discharge." 7
Plaintiff appealed, asserting that the district court applied the wrong
standard for interpreting discriminatory intent under section 504 and
that the court's ruling that his termination was based on his own behavior
was clearly erroneous."' The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court
did not misapply the legal standard under section 504 because even if
plaintiff had been capable of showing he was qualified for the position of
firefighter, the fire district had sufficiently demonstrated that plaintiff
was terminated for nondiscriminatory reasons."' Moreover, the Eleventh
Circuit stated that the Act did not require an employer to lower or alter
its standards to accommodate a handicapped individual when the standard employed is both nondiscriminatory and evenhanded." 0
Judge Kravitch, in her dissent, stated that the majority had erred in its
decision because it had decided the wrong issues. 51 She stated that it was
not important whether the employer had the. best of intentions in attempting to provide an accommodation to plaintiff or that plaintiff was a
"lawsuit promoting" individual.4' Instead, Judge Kravitch opined that
the sole issue on appeal was an issue regarding causation.'" She stated
that but for the fact that Severino had tested HIV-positive, he would not
have been fired.' According to Judge Kravitch, the majority's failure to
employ the causation analysis constituted an error as a matter of law.'
444. Id.
445.

Id.

446.

Id.

447. Id. at 1181.
448.
449.
450.
451.

Id.
Id. at 1182.
Id. at 1183.
Id. (Kravitch, J., dissenting).

452.
453.
454.
455.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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V. CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS OF 1866 AND 1871
A.

Post-PattersonCases

Cases continued to reach the Eleventh Circuit during the survey period
concerning the scope of section 1981 actions in the aftermath of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union."" Although these cases have limited significance in view of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, nevertheless
they provide an important historical background in the development of
civil rights litigation.
In Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc.,' 7 the court of appeals addressed the
the
lead of the
issue of the retroactive effect of Patterson. Following
6
"5 9
8
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second,"

Fifth,

Seventh,'

Ninth46 '

Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Pattersonwas
and
to be applied retroactively to cases on appeal.42 In Weaver, the court also
held that Patterson governed the case even though defendant had not
filed objections before the district court to the application of section 1981
to claims of discriminatory promotion and discharge decisions. Defendant
raised the Patterson issue on appeal and plaintiff failed to argue that
defendant had waived the issue, thereby waiving plaintiff's right to do
so." Application of Pattersonin Weaver required the court of appeals to

remand the case for consideration of the question whether the failure to
promote plaintiff denied him the opportunity to enter into a new contract
with defendant.464 The court of appeals held that plaintiff's claim that
defendant discriminatorily discharged plaintiff in violation of section
1981 was not cognizable under section 1981 in view of Patterson" 466
Similarly, the court of appeals in Wall v. Trust Company of Georgia,'
affirmed the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia's finding that plaintiff was precluded from bringing a racial discrimination claim under section 1981 as a result of her employer's refusal
to promote her to the position of tax analyst. The Eleventh Circuit found
that plaintiff had wholly failed to establish her burden under the Patter456.
457.
458.
459.
V &B
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

491 U.S. 164 (1989).
922 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1991).
Gonzalez v. Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1990).
Carroll v. General Accident Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1990); and Lavender v.
Transmissions & Auto Repair, 897 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1990).
Bailey v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 910 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1990).
Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, 899 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1990).
922 F.2d at 1519.
Id.
Id. at 1520.

Id.
946 F:2d 805 (11th Cir. 1991).
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son test.46 7 The Eleventh Circuit compared the similarities in pay, bene-

fits, and status of both plaintiff's current position as customer services
representative and that of tax analyst and held that plaintiff had not
demonstrated that her promotion to tax analyst would have created a
"new and distinct contractual relationship" between the employer and
the employee so as to trigger the protections of section 1981.468
B. Section 1983 Cases
4 69
In Brown v. City of Ft. Lauderdale,'
the Eleventh Circuit reversed a

district court's grant of defendants' motions to dismiss concerning plaintiff's claims of racial discrimination under both sections 1981 and 1983.
Plaintiff, a black police officer, brought suit against the City of Ft. Lauderdale, its city manager, and its police chief, asserting that he had been
fired because of his race. 4 ° The district court ruled that plaintiff's section
1981 claim was no longer actionable due to the Supreme Court's decision
in Patterson'" which held claims of discriminatory discharge no longer
viable under section 1981.472 The district court also dismissed the section

1983 claim against the city manager and police chief. The court found
that these two individuals were protected by a qualified immunity and
that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that these defendants knew or
should have known that they were infringing one of plaintiff's constitutional rights when they discharged him,'" Additionally, the district court
granted the city's motion to dismiss regarding its section 1983 liability
after it ruled that plaintiff had failed to allege that
racial discrimination
4 4
against blacks was a city-wide policy or custom.

7

The Eleventh Circuit reversed and vacated the district court's dismissal. The court declined to address plaintiff's section 1981 claims because
it found that the Supreme Court, in Jett v. Dallas Independent School
4
District,'
7
ruled that section 1983 "provides the exclusive federal dam-

ages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by [section] 1981
when the claim is pressed against a state actor.'

47

Because the district

court dispensed with plaintiffs section 1983 claim while his action was
still in its early pleading stages, the Eleventh Circuit stated it was re467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

Id. at 808.
Id.,
923 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1475.
Id. at 1478.
Id.
Id.
Id.
491 U.S. 701 (1989).
923 F.2d 1481 (quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989)).
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quired to reverse the district court unless, after accepting all of plaintiff's
material allegations as true, it appeared that plaintiff could not prove any
set of facts which would entitle him to the relief he requests.4 7 7 The Eleventh Circuit considered the district court's finding that both the city
manager and chief of police were entitled to a qualified immunity which
plaintiff had been unable to overcome. The court noted that plaintiff's
equal protection right to be free from intentional racial discrimination
was clearly established at the time these defendants made the decision to
terminate plaintiff.4'7 8 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiff had alleged enough specific instances of racial discrimination to have
plausibly demonstrated the existence of a racial motivation for defendso as to overcome the standard for granting a motion to
ant's actions
9
dismiss.'
The court of appeals considered the propriety of the district court's
dismissal of the city and found that plaintiff had alleged sufficient evidence to survive a motion to dismiss.'80 The Eleventh Circuit held that
the actions of either the police chief or the city manager could possibly be
deemed to be municipal acts which would be capable of creating a citywide policy or practice.41" The court stated that because the district court
failed to consider whether these individuals are final policymakers who
could act on behalf of the city, it inappropriately dismissed plaintiff's
complaint for failing to allege a custom of racial discrimination."'
In Busby v. City of Orlando,88 the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an Orlando policewoman's claims that her discharge from her job as an airport
safety officer violated her First Amendment right of free speech and constituted racial discrimination. Plaintiff claimed that she was discharged
because she had written memoranda to various state and local leaders
exposing inappropriate conduct of fellow police officers on the Orlando
police force and due to the fact that she was black. 8' The defendants, the
mayor, the police chief, a police captain, and a police lieutenant, contended that plaintiff had been fired for failing to follow departmental policy. 8' The district court directed a verdict for defendants regarding
plaintiff's section 1983 First Amendment and racial discrimination claims

477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.

Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1479.
Id. at 1481.
Id.
Id.

Id.
931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir.,1991).
Id. at 770-71.
Id. at 769.
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after finding that defendants were immune from suit in their 'individual
and official capacities."'
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the directed verdict in favor of defendants
in their official capacities, however, it found that only the police chief was
entitled to a qualified immunity from suit in his individual, capacity.' 7
The Eleventh Circuit noted that defendants were entitled to a qualified
immunity with regard to plaintiff's claim that their decision to discharge
her violated plaintiff's right to freedom of speech. 8 The court of appeals
stated that public employers are entitled to immunity from suit unless it
can be objectively shown that their decision to discharge stems from an
unlawful motivation."" The Eleventh Circuit held that whatever modicum of First Amendment protection plaintiff's comments were to be accorded, they were nonetheless outweighed by the legitimate interests of
defendants in maintaining the loyalty, discipline, esprit de corps, and the
good reputation of the Orlando police force.' "
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed that defendants, with the exception of
the police chief,'1 were entitled to a qualified immunity upon the section
1983 racial discrimination claim.4 0 The court of appeals ascertained that
the district court had granted a directed verdict upon both plaintiff's
First Amendment and racial discrimination claims based upon defendant's assertion of a qualified immunity defense to only the First Amendment claim. 9 The defendants failed to raise a qualified immunity defense to plaintiff's discrimination claim during trial. Moreover, the court
of appeals noted that unlike plaintiff's First Amendment claim, defendants were precluded from asserting a qualified immunity defense to plaintiff's section 1983 discrimination claim.' The Eleventh Circuit held that
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff had a right to be free from racial discrimination at the time of her
discharge and that a reasonable person would have concluded that such
486. Id. at 772. In affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit noted that plaintiff's
claims against the defendants in their individual capacity should properly have been
brought against the City.
487. Id. at 782. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling with regard to
Chief Walsh due to the lack of substantial evidence in support of plaintiff's racial discrimination claim.
488. Id. at 775.
489. Id. at 773.
490. Id. at 774.
491. Id. at 782,
492. Id. at 775.
493. Id.
494. Id.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

1171

conduct may have violated plaintiff's constitutional rights so as to invalidate the qualified immunity defense.4'
In Wilson v. Bailey," plaintiffs asserted that the district court's rulings which denied plaintiffs a jury trial and granted a partial summary
judgment on the issue of plaintiff's recovery of money damages in favor of
defendant, an Alabama sheriff, were erroneous.' The Eleventh Circuit
disagreed with plaintiff's contentions and affirmed the ruling of the district court. The court of appeals noted that plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief which is not triable by a jury in a section 1983 action and upheld
the district court's ruling.'"g Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
district court had appropriately held that the Eleventh Amendment
barred plaintiffs' recovery of monetary damages from a sheriff.4 "
VI. EQUAL PAY ACT
The Eleventh Circuit decided only one Equal Pay Act s appeal during
this survey period. In Mitchell v. Board of Education,501 the court of appeals reversed the district court's holding that defendant's revised pay
schedule granting annual step increases on the basis of length of service
was a bona fide seniority system for purposes of both the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII.520 Plaintiff was employed by the defendant Board of Education as a printing equipment operator I. Plaintiff claimed that defendant discriminated against her on the basis of sex with respect to training,
job assignments, and wages in violation of both the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII.' ° Plaintiff based her claims of discrimination on a comparison
of her wages with those'of a male co-worker who was employed one year
earlier than she and who held the job title printing equipment operator
II.
The crux of the dispute concerned defendant's institution and later revision of a salary schedule.'04 Collective bargaining negotiations produced
a new schedule which reduced the number of pay grades from seven to
five by combining job classifications. In addition, all five of the new pay
grades now had eleven steps each, so that the former seventeen steps of
495. Id.
496. 934 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1991).
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 305 n.4. Plaintiffs were white male deputy sheriffs who had brought a reverse
discrimination action against their employer under Title VII, Section 1981 and Section 1983.
500. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988)).
501. 936 F.2d 539 (11th Cir. 1991).
502. Id. at 544.
503., Id. at 541.
504. Id.
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two of the pay grades had to be compressed.508 Employees were placed on
the new salary schedule at the grade and step that was closest to but not
lower than their salary under the previous pay schedule. As can be expected, the conversion from the old schedule to the new affected employees differently. It is this unequal treatment that spawned plaintiff's
claims.
The defendant never pled a bona fide seniority system defense to either
the Equal Pay Act claim or the Title VII claim. The district court, however, granted judgment for the defendant on both claims based upon the
determination that the disparity between the wages of plaintiff and the
male co-worker resulted from the operation of a bona fide seniority
system.506
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court's finding that the pay
schedules constituted bona fide seniority systems. 0 1 The court of appeals
based this rejection on the fact that the original salary schedule did not
reflect seniority or longevity because each employee was placed on the
schedule based solely on the job description that defendant had applied
to the employee's duties at some earlier time, and the employee's assignment at that time was not based on seniority. 08 Further, the revised pay
schedule did nothing more than increase each employee's pay annually
without any reference to the employee's actual length of service with defendant, or the employee's date of hire in relation to that of other
employees.509
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the salary schedules merely rewarded all employees for continuing to work; they did not reflect total
length of employment as contemplated by the use of the term "seniority"
by the bona fide seniority system defense.10 The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court to make findings of fact to determine whether the'plaintiff and the male co-worker performed equal work
as defined by the Equal Pay Act, but affirmed the district court's ultimate
finding under Title VII that plaintiff had failed to prove intentional gender discrimination under the disparate treatment analysis.5 1' Finally, the
court of appeals rejected defendant's claim that plaintiff's action was
barred by the Equal Pay Act's two year statute of limitations under the
continuing violation theory applicable to federal wage and hour claims.'2

505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
at
at

541-42.
543.
544-45.
545.

Id. at 546.
Id. at 548.
Id.

